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Cold War Entanglements of Social Science  
ANDY BYFORD 
Durham University 
Cold War Social Science: Knowledge Production, Liberal Democracy, and Human Nature, 
edited by Mark Solovey and Hamilton Cravens, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, xviii 
+ 270 pages, $90.00, ISBN: 978 0 230 34050 3. 
The Cold War era – the three decades between the end of the Second World War and the end 
of the Vietnam War – was a period of unprecedented institutional and professional expansion 
of the social sciences in the United States (Backhouse & Fontaine 2010; Calhoun 2007). The 
multi-authored volume under review, based on papers presented at a workshop held at the 
University of Toronto’s Victoria College in 2010, approaches the complexities and 
controversies of this history from a wide variety of perspectives. Defining ‘social science’ 
broadly as the organized study of human nature and society with scientific claims (p. 6), it 
situates key elements of this field’s institutionalization within the political and cultural 
framework of ‘America’s Cold War’ (Farish 2010). More specifically, it focuses on the 
multiple ambiguous ‘entanglements’ (p. 14) of US social science in the military-industrial 
projects and politico-ideological agendas associated directly or indirectly with the 
maintenance of US national security and super-power supremacy in the era of Cold War 
tensions with the USSR. 
In the Introduction (pp. 1-22), Mark Solovey discusses at length the usefulness of the label 
‘Cold War social science’, which denotes a historically-specific form of doing social science 
that shaped this field in the United States during a defining period of its institutional 
development. It denotes that the Cold War was more than a mere historical or political 
context and suggests that US social science was deeply and controversially implicated in, as 
well as formed by, the Cold War, and that it is in some ways still haunted by its ‘spectre’ (p. 
3). Yet what is at stake in the volume is not a familiar critique of the ‘militarization’ of US 
social science in this era (Robin 2001), but a much broader exploration of the complex and 
unpredictable ‘enmeshing’ of the agendas of  social scientists, US government agencies (the 
military in particular), and political agents of all hues in post-war America. 
In this context ‘the Cold War’ is made to stand for a number of different things, from a 
particular political climate (especially, but not exclusively, coloured by the struggle with ‘the 
Communist threat’) to new, ‘soft’ forms of warfare (demanding a strategic understanding of 
both enemy and ally societies, cultures and psychologies, as well as the development of 
technologically useful models of human nature). Yet the contexts framing particular case 
studies presented in the volume often go beyond the Cold War as such. Most chapters, in fact, 
reach back to the original mobilization of social science in US defence projects during the 
Second World War, of which ‘Cold War social science’ thus often appears to be merely an 
extension or modulation. Equally, the volume situates the post-war transformations of US 
social science in broader social and political developments, especially the emergence and 
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expansion of new left movements, such as those focused on race and gender, or in key 
technological advances, such as the appearance of the computer and the rise of television. 
This relatively open and flexible approach allows the different authors to introduce into ‘Cold 
War social science’ a number of unanticipated elements and nuances that have in previous 
analyses not been automatically associated with this notion. Particularly significant here are 
the ambivalences of political positioning between right and left in which social science 
becomes embroiled. However, the extent to which ‘Cold War social science’ is developed 
here as a specifically American phenomenon, despite the fact that the Cold War was a global 
war (Westad 2006), is not discussed nearly enough. Indeed, in this volume ‘Cold War social 
science’, and the analytical perspective that this concept entails, is restricted to the 
historicization of the ambiguous political and institutional underpinnings of the US field of 
social science. Although the volume is rich and interesting enough in this respect, a more 
sustained discussion of the potentials of a comparative approach, namely of what ‘Cold War 
social science’ might mean (politically and otherwise) beyond the United States, especially in 
the post-war Soviet Union, but also in a recovering Western Europe, would have added depth 
to our understanding of the concept and enhanced its usefulness in historical analysis. 
At the forefront of the book’s concerns is the examination of the productive, as well as 
problematic, nexus of state and academic agendas, specifically the interface of military 
strategizing, politico-ideological engagements, and social-scientific knowledge production.  
In addition to this, the volume exemplifies, if often only tacitly, a particularly interesting 
approach to the historicization of ‘social science’ as a techno-scientific field more generally. 
The different contributors regularly factor into their analyses significant macro developments, 
such as the post-war emphasis on ‘big science’ patronized by large state or private funding 
bodies, or major paradigm shifts, such as the rise and fall of behaviourism or of grand theory 
building. However, the volume’s key strengths are in its micro-historical approach, which 
presents ‘social science’ as a fundamentally heterogeneous and unsystematic field of 
academic endeavour. Social science is here made up less of disciplines or paradigms and 
more of a plurality of relatively short-term projects, enterprises and movements. These 
emerge through the concrete mobilization and organization of scientific work, and then 
invariably disintegrate, or else shift into some other enterprise, either within or outside of the 
academic field (Frickel & Gross 2005). And needless to say, the diverse projects that make 
up ‘social science’ in history are never simply or straightforwardly ‘scientific’, but involve a 
range of significant stakeholders with alternative interests and purposes, which in this volume 
are located in the context of the (US) ‘Cold War’. 
Each of the book’s chapters is a case study illustrating such an understanding of ‘social 
science’. For example, David C. Engerman (pp. 25-43) tells the story of the rise and fall of 
the Harvard Refugee Interview Project (1950-54), designed to understand ‘Russia and the 
Russian’ (p. 26) for predominantly strategic military purposes. This was conducted by way of 
structured and in-depth interviews of ‘displaced persons’ from the Soviet Union in the 
American zone of occupied Germany. Engerman shows persuasively the ‘militarization’ of 
academia and the ‘academization’ of the military at the juncture where the Second World 
War morphed into the Cold War. The focus of his analysis is, however, on politics within 
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social science itself, namely the formation of Harvard’s new, behaviourist Department of 
Social Relations (DSR) and the strategic role occupied in it by the Russian Research Centre. 
The latter’s purpose was to apply the methods of behavioural research to a systematic as well 
as pragmatic study of Soviet society, and to develop an exemplary model for interdisciplinary 
policy-oriented social science. Yet as Engerman shows, the outcome of this ambitious 
programme failed to respond efficiently enough to the Pentagon’s strategic needs, leading to 
divisions in the military, a series of critical Congressional inquiries, and eventually the 
project’s closure. 
In another chapter Joel Isaac (pp. 79-95) reveals also the importance that Harvard’s DSR 
placed on the problem of arranging empirical data (especially those generated in the study of 
small social groups), into configurations that allowed this data’s direct insertion into a general 
theory of social systems. Isaac dubs this the problem of ‘epistemic design’ and explores its 
development in the project known as The Values Study, which involved the systematic 
coding and comparison of the folkways of five distinct ‘small groups’ (a Navajo reservation 
settlement, a Zuni pueblo, a Mormon community, a group of Texan and Oklahoman 
homesteaders, and a Spanish-American village). Isaac argues that this project’s emphasis on 
formalizing supposedly ‘neutral’ social data in a theoretically pertinent way was closely 
connected to DSR’s negotiation of the autonomy of the new sciences of human behaviour in 
the context of policy-related strategic frameworks imposed by the military and other 
sponsors. 
A number of other case studies similarly demonstrate the importance of situating the analysis 
of particular technologies of scientific production at the interface between, on the one hand, 
narrow scientific legitimation of a particular social science enterprise and, on the other, wider 
claims made in the social, political or military realm. For instance, Kaya Tolon (pp. 45-62) 
examines the flourishing of the so-called Futures Studies Movement, which emerged as a 
fusion of mathematical models of strategic thinking developed in the 1950s by the RAND 
Corporation (the social sciences arm of the US Air Force), and the 1960s-70s push for new 
quantitative and predictive methodologies in policy-oriented social science research. Tolon 
emphasises the broad social movement dimension of Futures Studies and its ambivalent 
success as a scientific endeavour, despite the backing it received from high-status academics 
and politicians alike. Janet Martin-Nielsen (pp. 63-78) analyses the way the emergence of 
computers impacted on linguistics in the US, focusing on considerable military and civilian 
investments in the ultimately failed Machine Translation Project during the late 1950s and 
early 1960s. Martin-Nielsen connects this to the historically highly significant harnessing of 
emergent computer technologies in the American linguists’ efforts to transform their work 
into legitimate ‘science’. 
The volume also addresses the wider ideological implications of social science in this era. For 
instance, Hunter Heyck (pp. 99-116) charts the rise of theories of decision-making in post-
war America, conceptualising them as an effort to develop a new model of rationality in the 
face of growing pessimism about the ability of human beings to govern themselves in a 
rational way. The latter attitude was, however, paralleled by considerable optimism about the 
possibility of designing artificial systems that would generate rational choices automatically, 
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something closely aligned with the interests of patrons from the military and large business 
corporations. This project entailed redefining reason by shifting the unit of analysis from the 
all too fallible human decision-maker to the rationality of the choices themselves. Yet, by the 
1970s, the foregrounding of the rationality of choice gave way to a new emphasis on the 
freedom of choice (whether in the economic or the social context), something that Heyck 
associates with further shifts in the Cold War articulations of liberal democratic values in 
contrast to the Soviet ‘other’. 
What is especially important in this context is the volume’s stress on the ambivalent 
positioning of social science between the political left and right respectively. Thus, Joy 
Rohde (pp. 137-153) examines the controversy surrounding the Special Operations Research 
Office (SORO) based at the American University in Washington, DC and sponsored by the 
Pentagon. This unit was envisaged at the time as an example of the military delegating its 
knowledge base to civilian experts. However, SORO was devoted not only to the impartial 
social study of the Third World, but also to developing strategically-significant research, such 
as projects designed to anticipate and prevent Communist revolutions or to promote anti-
Communist groups in developing countries. Rohde focuses in particular on the effect of the 
debacle of this enterprise in the late 1960s in the face of growing public opposition to the 
Vietnam War, which led to vigorous student campaigns to oust Pentagon-funded centres from 
the universities. Despite the apparent success of this action, this type of strategic research 
continued unabated off campus. This meant that the vilified ‘military-academic-industrial 
complex’ was by no means dismantled, but only became less accountable to evolving 
scientific standards. And, conversely, the knowledge base that national security organs now 
referred to was more difficult to challenge since it circulated in small-scale classified reports, 
rather than open-access academic publications. 
The editors have put the fragmentary approach of the ‘collected essays’ format to good use, 
while ensuring systematic cross-referencing and thematic interlinking between the assembled 
case studies. The arguments put forward in each chapter are not definitive statements on their 
respective topics, but they are all invariably very interesting and informative, and the angles 
of approach chosen by the contributors are both insightful and thought-provoking. The 
volume would, however, have benefitted from a more sustained concluding discussion of the 
historical legacies of Cold War developments in the contemporary social sciences. The 
suggestion by the volume’s editors that the enterprise of American social science had 
effectively been made in the period in question is a persuasive one; yet it begs the question of 
whether and how things might have changed after the collapse of the Berlin Wall or, for 
instance, after 9/11. Particularly significant here is the thorny issue of the continued 
dependence of the project of ‘social science’ as such on the welfare/warfare state.  This is 
why this book can be read as an instructive series of ‘lessons from history’, which reveal in 
an original and enlightening way the considerable intellectual and institutional complexities 
of the formative relationship between the social sciences and its patrons, something that 
social scientists are increasingly grappling with today, both in the practical management of 
their projects, and in the articulation of the legitimacy of their work as ‘science’. 
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